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Practical Magic: A Few Down-to-Earth Suggestions for
the New Sentencing Commission
Most of the contributions to this outpouring of advice to
the new Sentencing Commissioners have to do with
the substance of the Guidelines. What follows here is
far more prosaic - some suggestions not about what the
Commission should do, but about how the Commission
should work. I make these suggestions with some trepidation, recognizing the difficulty of the task the new
members have undertaken. However, I hope the perspective of one who practiced before and after the
Guidelines as a federal prosecutor, participated in the
internal workings of the Commission as Special Counsel in 1995-96, and has been a careful observer of the
Commission from the academy for the last four years,
will at least provide food for thought.
The Commission and the Guidelines have been
widely criticized, and occasionally ridiculed, over the
past decade. Much of the criticism has been undeserved,'
but there is no denying that a once-vibrant and influential agency had slipped into a state of institutional nearparalysis. For the new Commissioners, for at least the
first year or two of their terms, the task of revitalizing the
U.S. Sentencing Commission will have less to do with
grand debates over matters of sentencing policy than with
the pragmatic demands of reinvigorating a government
organization that has been in suspended animation.
Hence, these suggestions.

At the outset of their terms, the new Commissioners
will need to make some difficult management choices
about the structure and operation of the agency they
now head. That will require investigation, personnel
evaluations, discussion, and deliberation. After the initial round of managerial work, the administration of the FRANK 0.
agency will continue to demand some amount of time
BOWMAN, III
and attention from individual Commissioners virtually
every month. As for the substance of the Commission's
rulemaking function, the issues require careful, inFSR Editor. Associate
depth study and reflection. Commissioners will have to Professor of Law, Indiread extensively, ask innumerable questions, organize
ana University School
in-house research, and solicit outside input. Finally, if
of Law, Indianapolis.
the Commission's decisions are to be both substanFormerly Special Countively wise and politically acceptable, the members of
sel, U.S. Sentencing
the Commission will need to seek out and engage the
Commission (1995opinion-makers among its various constituencies - the 96); Assistant U.S.
bench, the defense bar, the Justice Department, the
Attorney, Southern DisWhite House, Congress, the academy, the public. Taken trict of Florida (1989all in all, this is not an agenda for a group of hobbyists. 96); Deputy District
The problem, of course, is that all but one of the
Attorney, Denver, Colincoming Commissioners have other full-time jobs. Five orado (1983-87); Trial
are federal judges, and one a law professor. (The ComAttorney, Criminal Divimission is fortunate to have as its seventh member John sion, U.S. Department
Steer, long-time General Counsel to the Commission,
of Justice (1979-82);
who will work full-time on site in Washington.) Natuand sometime criminal
rally, neither the judges nor Professor O'Neill can be
defense attorney
expected to surrender their other positions. The obvious, and apparently simple, solution is for Commissioners to reduce dramatically their commitments to the
duties of their other jobs. In practice, this simple solution is unlikely to prove simple to execute, particularly
because so many of the incoming Commissioners are
judges. Past experience suggests the federal courts at
every level are so short-handed that the judge-members
of the Commission will find it difficult to make or sustain serious caseload reductions. Pressure from overburdened colleagues, or a feeling of obligation to pull one's
own weight "back home," will inevitably tug Commissioner-judges toward over-commitment to judging with
a concomitant reduction in the time available for Commission work. With full recognition of the tensions it
creates, I nonetheless implore new Commissioners with
other jobs to reduce, and reduce significantly, their commitments in those jobs, and to steel themselves to resist
the overt and subtle pressures to relax the discipline
required to maintain such reductions.

1. Review your professional commitments.
Being a United States Sentencing Commissioner is a
full- time job, with at least three components: (a)
Agency administrator; (b) Rulemaker; (c) Political
activist and educator. I'll address each of these components in a moment, but before doing so, I say again,
being a United States Sentencing Commissioneris afiulltime job. A good number of the Commission's difficulties in past years are traceable to the fact that many
(though by no means all) members of the Commission
could not, or would not, give the position the attention
it requires. Even the most diligent and best-intentioned
Commissioners have been hobbled by the fact that the
Commission has almost invariably been the second of
two jobs, a position physically (because in Washington,
D.C.) and emotionally separated from the consuming
day-to-day concerns of one's "real job" being a federal
judge, or practicing lawyer, or full-time teacher.
The work of the Commission is too complex, and
too important to the judicial system and the country, to
be managed on the fly by busy people who drop into
Washington once a month for two or three days, make
hurried decisions, and then return to their other lives.
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2. Work as a team. Accept leadership. Delegate.
The truth is that, with the best will in the world, most
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judicial members of the Commission will be unable to
reduce their other commitments to the degree that
would be desirable for optimum performance of the
Sentencing Commission. Given that reality, the Commissioners need to think hard about institutional
arrangements that will allow them to maximize their
limited personal time. The precise shape of those
arrangements will necessarily depend on individual
considerations into which I have no insight, but several
lessons from the past may be usefil.
First, the Commission should give the Chair a
strong leadership and management role. For better or
worse, the Commission's enabling legislation gave the
Chair little formal authority. She is, so far as her legal
powers are concerned, no more than first among
equals. In the past, the weak-Chair structure of the
Commission has sometimes been an impediment to
progress. The valuable time of the entire Commission
was expended on relatively minor matters of personnel
or administration. Important initiatives were stalled by
the opposition of one or two Commissioners. The Commission may be well advised to agree among themselves, either formally or informally, to grant the Chair
substantial authority in the conduct of the day-to-day
business of the agency, particularly regarding staffing,
budgetary, and other administrative matters.
Second, if all Commissioners try to do everything,
very little will be done, and even less will be done well.
Some decisions necessarily must be made as a collective, but a great deal of the Commission's work could
be broken into segments and allocated to single Commissioners or subgroups. The allocation might take the
form of subcommittees of the whole to address particular problems. It might take advantage of the particular
talents and circumstances of particular Commissioners
(as for example John Steer's full-time status and long
service as General Counsel, or Professor O'Neill's experience on the Hill and residence in the Washington
area). The specifics are not as important as the notion
that the Commission should steer away from the model
of having everybody do everything. Instead, the group
should delegate responsibilities among themselves to
reduce overall workload and improve decision quality
3. Invigorate the Commission staff.
The personal dedication and effective organization of
Commissioners is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for institutional success. Ultimately, the success or
failure of the new Commission will depend largely on
the quality of the Commission's staff. Overall staff quality will in turn depend on three key appointments: Staff
Director, General Counsel, and Research Director3
Staff Director: The person who really runs the
Sentencing Commission on a daily basis is the Staff
Director. A bad one will doom the best Commission initiatives to confusion and failure. And as Tim McGrath
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has demonstrated over the past year, a competent person can keep the place operating in the absence of any
direction whatever. The Staff Director should be given
sufficient authority to manage the day-to-day operation
of the Commission with only general directives from
the Chair and the Commission. The pitfall Commissioners should particularly avoid is the inevitable temptation to micro-manage personnel and other routine
matters.
General Counsel: Commissioner John Steer, following his well-deserved promotion from General
Counsel to Commissioner, will be the person best
suited to advise his colleagues on the desirable
qualifications for his successor. Among those
qualifications might be Washington political experience, an extensive background in federal criminal law
(as either a prosecutor or defense lawyer), and an existing familiarity with the Guidelines. If the General
Counsel's Office has had a weakness in the past, it has
been the dearth of lawyers with significant federal criminal courtroom experience. Those charged with analyzing and recommending changes to the federal criminal
system are inevitably handicapped if they have no practical experience with that system. Not every lawyer in
the General Counsel's Office need be an old trial
hound, but at least some should be.
Research Director: The research arm of the Sentencing Commission has been troubled for a long time.
It has a dual function, first, to collect data on the operation of the federal sentencing system, and second, to
apply social science methods to analyze that data in aid
of policy development. So far as a non-specialist like
myself can tell, the data collection half of the job is done
well enough. But the social science research arm of the
Commission is a shambles. Since the initial burst of
work in the early 199o's evaluating the newly-enacted
Guidelines, the Commission has produced precious
few meaningful studies. Commission staff have assembled some useful reports in response to congressional
requests or directives, and one or two individual
researchers at the Commission have routinely generated valuable insights., But the Commission's larger
research efforts have invariably been mired in methodological or organizational or political disputes, and have
emerged only after interminable delays noteworthy
even in a government bureaucracy.
The same pattern of disputes and delays has
plagued both purely internal studies and studies contracted out to outside academic researchers. Consider,
for example, the so-called "Just Punishment Study,"
authored by two outside researchers, Peter Rossi and
Richard Berk, under contract with the Commission.
The study was based on surveys taken in the Fall of
'993 and Spring ofi99 4 . Berk and Rossi presented a
draft final report to the Commission on October 30,
i995.6 The Commission accepted their report as meet-
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ing the terms of the contract but has never published it
under the aegis of the Commission. Instead, because
Commission staff and the two academics could never
agree on the final form of the product, Commission
researchers performed their own reanalysis of the BerkRossi data which ultimately appeared in a ten-page
"Research Bulletin" published in March '997, seventeen months after Berk and Rossi submitted their
"final" report.7
Equal or greater difficulties have plagued the
Commission's in-house research projects. The most
notable recent example is the Commission's report on
substantial assistance practices. The data for this study
was collected in 1994 and early 1995. A "Draft Final
Report" to the Commission was prepared in October
1995. In response to pointed internal criticisms, Commission staff then spent the next eighteen months
revising the draft "final" report, finally producing a
final, final staff report dated May 1997. The essential
findings of that report did not reach the public until
January 1998, in the form of a carefully edited summary authored by Linda Maxfield and John Kramer. To
this day, the actual underlying staff report can be
obtained only by going to the Sentencing Commission
office in Washington, D.C., and inspecting it on site or
borrowing it for twenty-four hours
The successful candidate for Research Director
should have well-established social science credentials,
ideally with an existing national reputation in criminology and/or sentencing research, thus bringing to the
research operation a credibility it has for some years
lacked. It would also be highly desirable that the
Research Director have an existing familiarity with federal criminal system and the Guidelines. The leader of
the Commission's research effort should not be obliged
to spend the first year or two of his (or her) tenure figuring out the basics of the system whose subtleties he is
supposed to be studying. The Commission should, in
consultation with the newly-appointed director, map
out a concrete research agenda, and then give the Director the autonomy and resources to carry it through.
This will undoubtedly require hiring additional Ph.D.level researchers (the Commission presently has only
three) and support staff, and on occasion funding contracts for outside research. The key to success will be
selecting, and thereafter supporting, a Research Director who will demand analytical rigor and accept nothing less than excellence in every Commission research
product.
4. Transform the Commission into a politically
effective institution.
One of the justifications advanced for creating a Sentencing Commission in the first place was the conceit
that such a commission of neutral experts would be
free to pursue just results insulated from the politics of
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crime and criminal justice. Of all the expectations for
the Guidelines system, this may perhaps have been the
most unrealistic. Crime and punishment have been staples of political controversy since Cain and Abel. There
was never the slightest chance that the executive or legislative branches would consent to remain permanently
aloof from decisions about criminal sentencing in the
federal courts.
Not only was the hope of keeping sentencing out
of the political arena unrealistic, it was fundamentally
misguided. In our era, to call any process "political" is
to affix a pejorative label connoting cynicism, demagoguery, and interest group manipulation. While modem politics may indeed display some of these features
(in common with the politics of every age of human
history), an effort to "remove an issue from politics" in
America is nothing less than an effort to remove it from
the arena of democratic choice. The prevention and
punishment of crime is one of the core functions of
government. Criminal law, particularly including the
law allocating criminal punishment, is only legitimate
when promulgated by democratically accountable institutions. Criminal laws, particularly those inflicting punishment, will only be effective when they comport, at
least roughly, with the public's sense of justice. Hence,
an effort to permanently objectify and bureaucratize the
process of making sentencing law risks being perceived
as illegitimate because it is undemocratic, and risks
being ineffective to the extent it is out of touch with the
popular will.
By placing the Sentencing Commission in the
judicial branch, requiring that roughly half its members
be sitting judges, and exempting the Commission from
norms of openness and procedural regularity required
of executive agencies, the Sentencing Reform Act
sought to insulate sentencing reform from politics. The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, though far from perfect,
are a remarkable achievement, and there can be no
doubt that the early isolation of the Commission from
direct political pressure contributed significantly to the
Commission's success in producing anything at all. But
the next phase of Guidelines development, the phase
we have been in since 1987, the process of studying,
explaining, evaluating, amending, and improving on
the original structure, demands a more open, transparent, participatory, "political" process. Nonetheless, the
Act assigns this highly visible political task to an agency
whose institutional ethos is predisposed toward the
secretive and apolitical mindset of the judiciary.
I suggest that, at this point in the history of the
Guidelines experiment, a Sentencing Commission will
function best, not when it acts in secret as an insular
cell of technocrats, but when it functions most openly,
most "politically" When formulating policy, the new
Commission should actively seek cooperation and
input from the public, and from public and private
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judges. The ethos of judging ordinarily requires abstention from overt political involvement. The placement of
the Commission in the judicial branch tempts even its
non-judges to see themselves as a breed of cloistered
jurists. But the hybrid character of the Commission has
always created an inherent tension, particularly for
those playing the dual role of judge-Commissioner. By
accepting appointment as Commissioners, the new
members, particularly the judges, accepted the challenge of balancing the conflicting demands of two jobs.
The final modest suggestion of this article is that those
who have taken up the challenge should enter into their
new role aware of its political dimension and prepared
build a Sentencing Commission which can act vigorously in the political arena.

institutions most interested in federal criminal law the judiciary, the Department of Justice, the defense
bar, the Congress, the academy. Observers of the Commission have been advising for some time that Guidelines changes are likely to be both substantively better
and more readily accepted when they are the product of
a broadly consultative process. 9 The new Commission
should follow in the footsteps of its immediate predecessors, at least insofar as the last Commission began
developing more open, inclusive procedures for developing and refining guideline amendments. The work
done on the so-called "economic crime package" by
Commission staff, judges, probation officers, prosecutors, and academics over the last two years has illustrated the value (as well as some of the drawbacks) of a
more transparent process.'
In addition, the Commission, as an institution and
as individuals, should begin immediately to cultivate
working relationships with essential opinion leaders
and decision makers in the federal sentencing community, notably including congressional leaders on both
sides of the aisle. The Commission may be able to discover what is desirablethrough research, consultation,
and reflection. But the limits of the possible are set by
Congress, as the Commission discovered to its embarrassment several years ago when the legislature rejected
amendments on crack and money laundering. The
crack/money laundering debacle could have been
avoided by a Commission that was politically aware and
politically active.
I do not mean to suggest that the Commission
operate as a congressional weather vane, proposing
only initiatives preordained to receive reflexive support
from the legislative majority. Rather, the Commission
should become a full participant in the political process
in a way it has not for some years. This certainly entails
cultivating a sensitive appreciation of the limits of political possibility, but equally importantly, it requires a
Commission acting as educators and advocates, in public and private, to change the boundaries of the debate
and so to expand the limits of what is possible.
As but one example of how each component of the
Commission's rebuilding effort affects the other, the
political success of the Commission's educational advocacy will hinge in large measure on the success of its
internal project of strengthening its research and policy
analysis arm. As the enduring influence of the General
Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget Office
demonstrate, nonpartisan analytically rigorous reporting and policy analysis are politically powerful. The
more the Commission is perceived as basing its decisions on impartial, methodologically unimpeachable
analysis, the greater will be its political leverage.
I recognize that the vision of Sentencing Commissioners as energetic political actors may be jarring, particularly to those new members of the panel who are
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See generally Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, The Quality of Mercy Must
Be Restrained, and Other Lessons In Learning to Love the Fed679 (discussing
eral Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wisc. L. REV.
the common critiques of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
And in the case of the judges, even if they were disposed to
resign as judges to be Sentencing Commissioners, the
statute creating the Commission requires that at least three
Commissioners be sitting federal judges. See 28 U.S.C. §
99 1(a).
The following discussion should not be read as favoring or
excluding any particular potential candidate, or class of candidates, for the positions at issue. For example, the searches
for each position should not exclude internal candidates, as
viable internal candidates do exist for all three positions discussed here.
For example, Dr. Paul J. Hofer has authored or co-authored a
steady stream of important short papers (often published in
the Federal Sentencing Reporter). See, e.g., Christine Kitchens
& Paul J. Hofer, Pre-Arrest Drug and Alcohol Abuse Among Federal Offenders, 11 FED. SENT. R. 100 (1998); Pamela B.
Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An Empirical Study of the Application of the Relevant Conduct Guideline § 1B1.3, 10 FED.SENT.
R. 16 (1997); Paul J. Hofer, Willie Martin & Pamela Montgomery, Departure Rates and Reasons after Koon v. United
States, 9 FED.SENT. R. 284 (1997); Paul J. Hofer, Discretion to
Depart after Koon v. United States, 9 FED.SENT. R.8 (1996).
Linda Drazga Maxfield, et al., Research Bulletin: Just Punishment: Public Perceptions and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 2 n.3 (available at the Sentencing Commission
website, http://www.ussc.gov).
Memorandum from Phyllis J. Newton, Staff Director, to
Chairman Richard Conaboy, October 30, 1995 (on file with
author).
Maxfield, et al., supra note 5.
See U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1999-2000 GUIDE TOPUBLI-

3

6

4, 26 (1999) (available at the SentencCATIONS ANDRESOURCES

ing Commission website, http://www.ussc.gov).
See, e.g., Marc. L. Miller & Ronald F Wright, Your Cheatin'
Heart(land): The Long Search for Administrative Sentencing JusCRIM. L. REv. 723 (1999).
tice, 2 BUFFALO
'0 For discussion of the ongoing project of re-examining the
economic crime provisions of the Guidelines, see Vol. 10, No.
3 of the Federal Sentencing Reporter, an issue devoted to
Rethinking "Loss" in Fraud and Theft Cases, and United States
Sentencing Commission, A Field Test of Proposed Revisions to
the Definition of Loss in the Theft and Fraud Guidelines (Octo.
ber 20, 1998) (available at http://www.ussc.gov).
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